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EXCISE

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ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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TO : Department of State WASHINGTON -

INFO: MOSCOW

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
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FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: February 12, 1965.

SUBJECT: Reaction to Swedish TV Program on Disappearance of Raoul WALLENBERG

REF : Embtel 532; Department's A-115; Embtel 362 602



Apart from the Swedish Government's reaction to the release and publication of the U.S. official messages and the Embassy's role therein, is the question of the effect the TV program has had on Swedish public opinion. Because of criticism directed against the Swedish Legation's action in refusing American help, the Swedish Government has felt impelled to issue a press release through the Foreign Office, a translation of which is attached as enclosure number 3. (Two copies of the original Swedish version of the Foreign Office press release are also attached.)

It will be seen that the Foreign Office press release blandly ignores the criticisms levelled against the Legation's action. At the same time, the confused and turgid quotation attributed to the Swedish Minister, Söderblom, in the third paragraph of the press release implies that it was the U.S. Embassy in Moscow that did not wish to pursue the matter. The Foreign Office apparently went even further, because Dagens Nyheter on February 9 stated

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Clearances: DCM:AleSJenkins

USIS:Mr. Moe

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"the Foreign Office tells Dagens Nyheter that it is still unclear just how the Swedish rejection of the American offer of assistance was made -- 'and whether the rejection did at all come from Swedish quarters'" (the inner quote apparently refers to the Foreign Office official's exact words).

The fact that the Foreign Office press release used a partial and confusing quote of Minister Söderblom's without publication of the full text of the message (while publishing the text of the American official documents) has aroused the suspicions of the Swedish press. Thus, Liberal Göteborg's Handels Tidningen wrote that "unfortunately one has reason to suspect that the Swedish version was doctored" (not doctored by the Foreign Office, but by Söderblom at the time).-- Liberal Stockholm Dagens Nyheter was sarcastic as to why the Foreign Office did not produce the full text of the Söderblom message, hinting it was because Wallenberg was an American agent. Social-Democratic Stockholms-Tidningen, however, ignoring the careful avoidance of the question by the Foreign Office press release, wrote: "The American offer in April 1945 of diplomatic support in the search for Raoul Wallenberg was judged as non-desirable by the Swedish Moscow Minister, and the Foreign Office was of the same opinion." The principal press reactions to date are enclosed as enclosure no. 4.

If there should be further critical press reaction to the Foreign Office press release, it is entirely possible that the Government will feel called upon to take some further action.

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For the Ambassador:

George R. Andrews
George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

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TRANSLATION OF FOREIGN OFFICE PRESS RELEASE, FEBRUARY 8, 1965.

In the course of the TV program on February 2, 1965, concerning Raoul Wallenberg the content was shown and recapitulated of an exchange of telegrams in April 1945 between the State Department in Washington and the American Embassies in Stockholm and Moscow regarding the possibility of American diplomatic support in the search for Wallenberg. The texts of the three messages which formed part of the exchange of telegrams and which have now been placed at the disposal of the Foreign Office are enclosed in translation.

By telegram of April 4, 1945, to the State Department the then American Ambassador in Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, requested that the American Embassy in Moscow support the Swedish Legation in Moscow in its efforts through the Soviet authorities to ascertain what had happened to Wallenberg. By telegram of April 9, 1945, the State Department instructed its Embassy in Moscow to render all necessary support to the Swedish Legation. The then American Ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, reported by telegram of April 12, 1945, that the Swedish Legation had declared that it had no reason to believe that the Soviet authorities were not doing what they could in respect of this search, and that the Legation did not feel that an American approach to the Soviet Foreign Ministry would be desirable.

The telegrams reflect contacts which during the final stage of the war occurred between the Foreign Office and the American Embassy in Stockholm as well as between the Swedish and the American missions in Moscow concerning the search for Wallenberg then in progress. The Swedish Legation reported afterwards to the Foreign Office about the contacts in Moscow. The Legation stated in its report that the American Embassy in Moscow was believed to have replied to Herschel Johnson "that it presumed that the American representation in Hungary had been approached through the State Department. The Embassy otherwise is hardly likely to feel that anything was to be done for America's part".

As is seen from the Foreign Office White Paper on Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish demarche on the matter was made on April 25, 1945, to the Soviet authorities.

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Press Reacti

rogram on Wallenberg Case

I Dagens Nyheter (General) February 9 (news report):

"The Foreign Office tells Dagens Nyheter that it is still unclear just how the Swedish rejection of the American offer of assistance was made -- and whether the rejection did at all come from Swedish quarters".

"The Foreign Office Press Bureau said Monday evening that it may be that Minister Staffan Söderblom (then Swedish Minister in Moscow) did not judge American assistance in the Wallenberg case as being profitable. The Minister himself had previously made several representations to the Soviet authorities without result. But on the other hand, it may have been the American Embassy in Moscow which felt that possible American assistance would not serve much of a purpose."

II Dagens Nyheter February 9 (editorial):

"The American Minister in Stockholm during World War II, Herschel Johnson, appears more and more as having been a driving force behind the efforts to clarify the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. This is seen from the three American telegrams which were published in full by the Foreign Office on Monday. A communique from the Foreign Office also quotes a passage from a telegram from the Swedish Legation in Moscow; one must ask why that telegram was not quoted in full. The customary secretiveness?

"As the material is now presented it is partly contradictory. The telegram from Harriman to Washington says that Swedish quarters (apparently then Moscow Minister Söderblom) did not feel that an American approach in favor of Wallenberg would be desirable because the Russians surely nevertheless 'are doing what they can'. The telegram from the Swedish Legation to Stockholm says that the American Embassy in Moscow 'is hardly likely to feel that anything is to be done for America's part' concerning Raoul Wallenberg. But could this not be a question of cause and effect? The negative Swedish attitude caused the American interest to decline.

"The fact is that a Swedish demarche was made shortly afterwards in Moscow concerning Raoul Wallenberg. But how much greater weight would not an energetic American action had carried at that time. With some interest shown by Sweden it would without doubt have been brought about. It is difficult not to be disturbed by the Swedish passiveness -- then."

III Göteborgs Handelstidning (Liberal), February 9

"After several days, the Foreign Office has produced some sort of commentary to the American offer of assistance in the

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Wallenberg affair which was recently referred to in a Swedish TV program. The Foreign Office publishes the American exchange of telegrams, but not the Swedish Moscow Legation's report on the subject. One quotation from this report appears in the Foreign Office communique, however. It is seen from the material available, that Washington instructed Ambassador Harriman in Moscow to assist the Swedes but that nothing was done. Harriman reported home that the Swedes in Moscow did not want any help, while the Swedish Legation in turn asserted that it was the American Embassy which saw no reason to intervene. A typical example of how unsatisfactory diplomatic reports can be. Unfortunately, one has reason to suspect that the Swedish version was doctored. The Americans were eager, but it is doubtful whether the same could be said about the Swedish Legation."

IV Svenska Dagbladet (Conservative), February 9

"The American material now published by the Foreign Office confirms in full measure the great and positive interest which Washington showed to shed light on the disappearance of the Swedish diplomat. ...

"It is an only too well known and a tragic fact that Swedish optimism and faith in the Russian intentions lacked any foundation. Nor is it surprising that many quarters have criticized the Swedish Government for its negative attitude toward the American offer. Here the leading Western Power promised to put its weight and authority behind an inquiry, but this possibility, the critics maintain, was not seized upon. The matter has also another side, however. At the time in question, the cold war which was to follow upon the Second World War was already under full development. The Russians' almost pathological suspiciousness against everything Western found expression in practically the entire territory where their troops had marched in, and everything was being done to wipe out the traces of Western Power activities and influence. Is it not likely in these circumstances that an open American engagement in favor of a Swedish diplomat would have increased the suspiciousness against him and further impaired his situation in front of criminally unscrupulous-interrogators?"

V Stockholms-Tidningen (Social Democratic), February 10

"The American offer in April 1945 of diplomatic support in the search for Raoul Wallenberg was judged as non-desirable by the Swedish Moscow Minister, and the Foreign Office was of the same opinion. This is documented by an exchange of telegrams now made public."

ST then goes on to quote, first Dagens Nyheter's criticism of the Swedish passiveness at the time, and then Svenska Dagbladet's understanding attitude toward the Swedish rejection of the U.S. offer, adding:

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"This is how diametrically different judgments can be twenty years afterwards. It sheds light on the difficulty in establishing whether the Coalition Government, which was still in office in April 1945, and Foreign Minister Günther committed a misjudgment. Otherwise, it must be said to be of highly peripheral interest for a clarification of the Wallenberg case. It provides no new clue in the search."

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DEPARTEMENTET
Pressbyrå

Roll A 511
Stockholm

Pressmeddelande måndagen den 8 februari 1965

Under TV-programmet den 2 februari 1965 om Raoul Wallenberg visades och återgavs innehållet av en telegramväxling i april 1945 mellan State Department i Washington och de amerikanska ambassaderna i Stockholm och Moskva angående möjligheten av amerikanskt diplomatiskt stöd vid efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Texterna till tre meddelanden, som ingick i telegramväxlingen och vilka numera ställts till det svenska utrikesdepartementets förfogande, bifogas i översättning.

I ett telegram av den 4 april 1945 till State Department hemställde den dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Stockholm, Herschel Johnson, att amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva måtte stödja den svenska legationen i Moskva i dess strävanden att genom de sovjetiska myndigheterna fastställa Wallenbergs öde. I ett telegram av den 9 april 1945 instruerade State Department sin ambassad i Moskva att ge allt erforderligt stöd åt den svenska legationen. Den dåvarande amerikanske ambassadören i Moskva, Averell Harriman, rapporterade i ett telegram av den 12 april 1945, att svenska legationen förklarar sig ej ha anledning att tro, att sovjetiska vederbörande icke gjorde vad de kunde i fråga om dessa efterforskningar, och att legationen icke ansåg att en amerikansk framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet skulle vara önskvärd.

Telegrammen avspeglar kontakter som under krigets slutskede förekom mellan utrikesdepartementet och amerikanska ambassaden i Stockholm samt mellan de svenska och amerikanska beskickningarna i Moskva angående de pågående efterforskningarna av Wallenberg. Svenska legationen rapporterade i

Secretary of State, Washington

Stockholm den 4 april 1945.

1251, 4 april kl. 5 e.m.

Svenska utrikesdepartementet är mycket bekymrat över att attachén vid legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenberg, försvunnit. Enligt obekräftade radiomeddelanden har han mördats. Svenska legationen i Moskva har instruerats att begära ryska regeringens bistånd att fastställa Wallenbergs öde.

I mitt 14 den 4 april kl. 5 e.m. sändes detta till Moskva.

Vi hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern och skulle mycket uppskatta varje stöd som vår ambassad i Moskva kan lämna den svenska legationen i Moskva i denna sak.

Johnson

Ambassy, Moskva

Washington den 9 april 1945.

Följande till Harriman från departementet och krigsflyktingstyrelsen (War Refugee Board).

Vi hänvisar till Stockholms nr 14 den 4 april till Er, sänt till departementet som nr 1251 den 4 april.

Departementet och styrelsen skulle uppskatta om Ni gäve allt möjligt stöd åt svenska legationen i Moskva vid dess hemställan till ryska regeringen om bistånd att fastställa attachéns vid svenska legationen i Budapest, Raoul Wallenbergs, öde.

Krigsflyktingstyrelsen hade särskilt intresse av Wallenbergs verksamhet i Ungern på grund av hans utomordentliga arbete för att skydda judar och andra offer för fiendens förtryck under fiendens ockupation av Ungern.

Stettinius

Secretary of State, Washington

Moskva den 12 april 1945.

1137, 12 april kl. 10.

Svenska legationen i Moskva informerades sent i december av sovjetiska utrikesministeriet att Wallenberg (Edert 824 9 april kl. 7 e.m.) vore i säkerhet i Budapest. Legationen mottog senare en rapport från den svenska representationen i Bukarest att Wallenberg hade lämnat Budapest ensam med bil med okänt färdmål och att han försvunnit. Legationen i Moskva ombad därpå sovjetiska myndigheterna att söka spåra honom, vilket de lovade att göra. Svenskarna säger, att de icke ha någon anledning tro att ryssarna inte gör vad de kan, och att de inte anse att en framställning till sovjetiska utrikesministeriet från vår sida skulle vara önskvärd. (Sänt till departementet som nr 1137; sänt till Stockholm som nr 16).

Medlemmarna av den svenska representationen i Budapest förväntas anlända till Moskva inom några få dagar på väg till Stockholm och de kan möjligen ha ytterligare upplysningar om Wallenberg.

Harriman

efterhand till utrikesdepartementet om kontakterna i Moskva. Legationen framhöll i sin rapport att den amerikanska ambassaden i Moskva torde ha svarat Herschel Johnson, "att den utgår ifrån att man genom State Department vänt sig till Amerikas representation i Ungern. Ambassaden torde i övrigt svårligen anse något vara att göra från amerikansk sida".

Såsom framgår av utrikesdepartementets vitbok om Raoul Wallenberg, gjordes den 25 april 1945 en svensk démarche hos de sovjetiska myndigheterna i ärendet.

EXCISE

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TO : Department of State

1965 SEP 28 AM 9 57

INFO : GOTEBOURG, REYKJAVIK, OSLO, HELSINKI, COPENHAGEN, MOSCOW.

 RM/AN
 ANALYSIS & DISTRIBUTION
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FROM : Amembassy STOCKHOLM

DATE: September 24, 1965.

SUBJECT: Statement by Prime Minister on WALLENBERG Affair

REF

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8/8/78

SUMMARY

The recently released Swedish White Paper on the case of Raoul WALLENBERG is a surprisingly strong effort to put pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative in the matter. The White Paper also needs to be seen in the domestic political context as an attempt by the Government to reply to opposition criticism that it has not been active enough in pursuing the question with the USSR. While the Wallenberg affair will continue to be a definite irritant in Swedish-Soviet relations, it will not affect the operation of Swedish neutrality policy.

There is enclosed an Embassy translation of a statement made by Prime Minister Tage ERLANDER on September 16 on the occasion of the release of the Swedish Government's White Paper on the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the Swedish diplomat who disappeared in Hungary in 1944 during the Soviet advance into that country. The White Paper released to the press comprises three sections: the Prime Minister's statement enclosed with this airgram, a chronological recitation of the history of the Wallenberg affair, and a series of documents bearing upon the subject, such as letters from Erlander to KHRUSHCHEV and KOSYGIN. The chronological account, together with the documentation (both of which are rather long), will be submitted separately as soon as the Embassy has been able to complete the translations.

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Drafted by:

POL: GR Andrews: CWA

Contents and Classification Approved By:

Charge T. Cameron, Jr.

Clearances:

FOR: JEL 26/AY, Jr.

1965 SEP 28 PM 4 39

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The Wallenberg case has been the most persistent issue of contention between Sweden and the USSR since the war. In addition, it has been a domestic political issue in Sweden. The bourgeois opposition has criticized the Social Democratic Government for not doing enough to clear up the mystery, and has urged the Government to make public the evidence available to it showing that Wallenberg was alive after August 1947, the date on which he is alleged by the Soviets to have died in Ljubljanka prison. The Government resisted these pressures on the grounds that to release the information would antagonize the Soviets and thereby reduce the chances of obtaining Wallenberg's release if he were actually still alive.

After the visit of KHRUSHCHEV to Sweden in June 1964, and during the campaign before the elections in September of that year, there was continued agitation by the bourgeois opposition for the Government to issue a White Paper which would put public pressure on the Soviets to be more cooperative and forthcoming in their investigations in the Wallenberg case.

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However, the Government still refused to agree to opposition demands for the release of its confidential documents, feeling that the time was not yet ripe, and that further efforts should be made with the Soviets behind the scenes. Subsequently, (which has only just been revealed through the publication of the White Paper), Prime Minister Erlander wrote to Premier Kosygin on the subject on February 11, 1965 (receiving a negative reply from the Soviet Ambassador in Stockholm). During Erlander's visit to the Soviet Union in June of this year, he again took up the Wallenberg case with Kosygin but without any result. It was at the conclusion of this trip apparently that Erlander decided to accede to the proposal of a White Paper, and rumors to this effect appeared in the press in July.

When the Government actually did issue its White Paper, three months later, the leaders of the opposition were not given an opportunity to study it ahead of time, but were presented with copies of it in a meeting of the Foreign Relations Council just a couple of hours before its release to the press. By releasing the White Paper in this fashion without prior consultation with the opposition, Erlander presumably intended to forestall any future opposition claim that the Government had acted upon the advice of the opposition,

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as well as to stress to the Soviet Union that the White Paper represents a considered step by the Government, acting upon its own initiative. The opposition leaders on the Council protested this mode of operation and refused to give their assent to the White Paper (on the theory that there might be additional documentation which should have been included in it), and requested that the Government make available to them the entire file on Wallenberg. Prime Minister Erlander has replied that the opposition is welcome to examine the Government's voluminous dossier on the case. There is another meeting of the Foreign Relations Council scheduled for October 1, at which time the opposition will probably express its satisfaction with the White Paper. In fact, the opposition press has been practically unanimous in commending Erlander for having pursued the case with such tenacity through the years, despite Soviet denials. However, the opposition will presumably insist that the Wallenberg affair not be shelved and that Sweden continue to make strenuous efforts to clarify the matter.

The White Paper contained one sensational new piece of evidence in the form of a statement by a respected and internationally known Swedish doctor, Professor Nanna SVARTZ, who said that while on a visit to Moscow in January 1961 she had learned from a Soviet professor that Wallenberg was then still alive but confined to a mental institution. This information was immediately communicated by Professor Svartz to Prime Minister Erlander and it has formed the basis for a series of Swedish representations to the Soviets ever since, although the information was subsequently retracted by Professor Svartz's informant under what appeared to be pressure from Soviet officials.

As for Erlander's statement itself, it is a surprisingly strong condemnation of Soviet behaviour, as can be seen from the following excerpts:

"The fate of Raoul Wallenberg has deeply engaged Swedish opinion...We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question. An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case. Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else....We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account....In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no


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efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion."

Conclusion:

The Government's White Paper, including Erlander's statement, represents an effort to put public pressure on the Soviets, while at the same time seeking to avoid giving undue offense. However, it is in effect also an admission of despair on the part of the Government that there can be a successful resolution of the Wallenberg case. In a sense, it is more of a gesture towards Swedish public opinion. However, Erlander specifically stated that "as long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued", so the case is not considered to be publicly closed, and will continue to be an irritant between Sweden and the USSR. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that whatever the frictions in Swedish-Soviet relations engendered by the Wallenberg affair, the Social Democratic Government is highly unlikely to let them affect its concept of Sweden's neutral and non-aligned role in the East-West conflict.

For the Charge d'Affaires ad interim



George R. Andrews
Second Secretary of Embassy

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PRIME MINISTER ERLANDER'S STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1965.

(In connection with release of the Government's White Paper)

The fate of Raoul WALLENBERG has deeply engaged Swedish opinion. He was arrested and carried away by a foreign Power while in diplomatic service for Sweden. His heroic achievements to save Hungarian Jews from brutal persecutions by German and Hungarian Nazis have aroused deep admiration and affection. We have had proof that he was in prison in the Soviet Union. This is the background for the intensive Swedish efforts to find out his whereabouts and have him sent home.

In 1957, the Foreign Ministry made public an exhaustive collection of documents concerning Raoul Wallenberg, together with commentaries concerning his captivity in the Soviet Union. Allow me to make a short recapitulation.

In March 1944, after the German troops had marched into Hungary, a Swedish relief action was started for the Hungarian Jews. Raoul Wallenberg was assigned to the Legation in Budapest in July 1944 to lead the relief action under the direct supervision of the Chief of Mission, Minister DANIELSSON. He carried a Swedish diplomatic passport and enjoyed diplomatic immunity. He worked untiringly, with his own life at stake, to save Jews from Nazi persecution. He saved human lives by the thousands.

By the middle of January 1945, that part of Budapest where the Jews protected through the Swedish relief action were living fell in the hands of the Soviet troops. On January 16, the Soviet Foreign Ministry advised that Wallenberg was under the protection of the Russian troops.

The earlier White Paper [1957] contains detailed material on all the Swedish démarches which were made at that time and during the years to follow, to clarify Wallenberg's whereabouts and to have him transferred to Sweden. They were all fruitless. I wish to recall in particular that the Soviet Government in August 1947 informed us that as a result of a careful investigation it had been established that Wallenberg was not in the Soviet Union and that he was unknown to the Soviet authorities.

Between 1947 and 1951 no essentially new facts in the

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Wallenberg affair reached the Swedish Foreign Ministry. But in so far as foreign prisoners began to be sent home from the Soviet Union there appeared definite reports about Wallenberg being held in prison in Moscow. This prompted a new long series of Swedish démarches, similarly without result. In April 1956, Minister of the Interior Gunnar HEDLUND and I visited the Soviet Union. We had then the opportunity to present directly to the Soviet Union's Government an exhaustive account of the Swedish views. As a matter of fact, the talks primarily centered on the Wallenberg case. At the end of our talks, the representatives of the Soviet Government -- including BULGANIN, KHRUSHCHEV and MOLOTOV -- promised that a new extensive investigation concerning Wallenberg's fate would be made because of the evidence which had been collected and presented by Sweden.

On February 6, 1957, came the Russian reply. Its implication was as follows: in the course of the extensive Soviet investigations a document had been found according to which Raoul Wallenberg had died in the Ljubljanskaja Prison in Moscow on July 17, 1947. This had been told by the head of the health service in the prison, SMOLTSOV, to the chief of the Soviet security service, ABAKUMOV. The latter, it was stated in the Russian reply, had previously supplied the Soviet Foreign Ministry with false information. Abakumov was executed in connection with the purge within the Security Police following STALIN's death.

The Swedish Government's reaction to this reply was that it seemed difficult to believe that all documentation concerning Wallenberg's stay in Soviet prisons other than the document mentioned would be extinct. The Swedish Government reserved the right to submit any further material concerning Wallenberg that could be of importance for a continued investigation in the Soviet Union.

During the years which have followed since then, we have pursued our search and our efforts. We have left no trace unexplored, however vague it may have seemed. We have seized upon every opportunity to bring up the question, through diplomatic channels or by personal contacts. Intensive checking of all material and thorough internal considerations have taken place all the time.

The collection of documents now being published aims at providing a comprehensive picture of what has happened since the earlier White Paper was published. Thus, it contains

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the texts of the notes exchanged with the Soviet Union since 1957. It accounts for the various conversations which we have had with members of the Soviet Government during this period, particularly my talks with Khrushchev in the summer of 1964 and with KOSYGIN in June of this year. Furthermore, the White Paper contains material about the testimonies on which we have founded our representations in recent years. These testimonies refer to two different periods of time.

First, it concerns the reports that Wallenberg during the 1950's had been in prison in Vladimir. We have sought to make contact with the prisoners of war returning from the Soviet Union who could be expected to have been in Vladimir during this period. All of the information obtained from them which could be placed in direct or indirect connection with Raoul Wallenberg has been the subject of testing. A collective judgment of the weight of this information was made in 1959 by Justices of the Supreme Court GYLLENSWARD and SANTESSON. Their pronouncement, which is included in the material now presented, is to the effect that in their opinion, and under Swedish law, the investigation at hand, although not containing full evidence in this respect, must be held as making likely that Wallenberg was alive at least during the early 1950's and that he was then in prison in Vladimir.

Second, the White Paper contains new testimony which appeared in January 1961. Professor Nana SVARTZ on a visit to Moscow had a conversation about Raoul Wallenberg with a prominent Soviet scientist. According to her testimony, the latter on her direct question then made a statement to the effect that Wallenberg was still alive. Professor Svartz has written a separate account, which forms part of the White Paper, about this statement and about her subsequent contacts with the Soviet scientist.

These testimonies have formed the basis for our recurring representations to the Soviet Government. We have concentrated our efforts to the opportunities when there have been possibilities for contact on the highest level. For an initiative from the highest quarters in the Soviet Union has seemed to be the absolute prerequisite for achieving clarity about the fate of Wallenberg and for having him returned to Sweden. During these contacts we have accounted for our material and for our views. We have sought to convince the Soviet leadership of the extraordinary seriousness with which Swedish quarters look upon this question.

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An essential part of our negotiations with the Soviet leaders during this time has come to concern the Wallenberg case.

Unfortunately, the result has been negative. The Soviet leaders firmly assert that Raoul Wallenberg is not in the Soviet Union -- either in prison, in hospital, or somewhere else. They persist that no material whatsoever exists concerning Wallenberg over and beyond the brief notation about his death in 1947 which we were told about in the Soviet reply of 1957. Repeated new investigations are said to have been made because of our representations, but no new material whatsoever has been uncovered. It is being stated that Wallenberg was never in Vladimir and that the statements by the Soviet scientist to Professor Svartz have been misinterpreted. It is being held forth that there is no reason whatsoever why the Soviet Union should detain Wallenberg, in whatever condition he may be, and reference is being made in this connection to all of the prisoners of war and others who have been allowed to return from the Soviet Union in recent years. The Russians express their regret about Raoul Wallenberg's fate, and call to mind in this connection all of the tragedies which followed in the wake of the war.

We have not achieved the result we have sought. Today, we make public our account.

All of the efforts made by Sweden in this case have naturally been motivated by Raoul Wallenberg's contribution to relieve suffering people and by consideration for his family. But this engagement and these efforts also have a wider aspect. In a democratic country, the individual citizen should be able to rest assured that the community will spare no efforts for his protection. As long as there is a possibility, this effort must continue and be pursued. In its effort to find a solution to the Wallenberg case, the Government has felt the support of a unanimous Swedish opinion.

Translation: Nils Moller.

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